By Spyridon Sfetas for AGORA
Following the collapse of communism and bipolarity, the former Balkan communist states saw their accession into the European Union as a confirmation of their European identity, as a framework for security and economic development.
This is a process which began in the middle of the past decade with the signing of association and stabilization agreements between the EU and the new democratic Balkan states and it was formally completed with the singing of a similar agreement of the EU with Serbia on the 29 April 2008.[1] The economic and political data differ from country to country and there is frequently a question posed whether Bulgaria and Romania actually met the conditions for full accession in 2007, as for example Slovenia and Cyprus, or whether their accession into Europe gained a momentum due to their accession into NATO and the geo-political significance of these countries of the Black Sea.
One also wonders whether Serbia, despite the gravity of the war and of its consequences, has a better infrastructure for accession into Europe and to what degree political reasons affect its European course. Irrespective of the answer that one may give, there is no doubt that Southeastern Europe belongs to the economic periphery of Europe since the 16th century and that the economic criteria cannot be the decisive indicator of how European a country is. A greater importance is placed on the cultural background and from this point of view all of the Balkan people feel that they belong to the European family, which constitutes a unity but in a diversity. The perspective of accession in Europe was and still is a powerful motivation for the Balkan states to proceed with the necessary reforms in their course of transition towards Europe, even if this transition is accomplished at a different speed for each state.
However, the EU to this date has remained an economic zone and a value system and failed to prove that it can also become a significant factor in the management of the crises in the Balkans and in finding solutions. With the start of the crisis in Yugoslavia in 1990/91, the then European Community could not understand that Yugoslavia as a united state did not have a future, that the Slovenians and Croatians were pursuing the establishment of independent states – the Slovenians for the first time in history – the Croatians after a millennium of absence of independent state life. The generous offer from Europe to Yugoslavia – economic aid and quick accession in the European Community – should it remain united, did not have an effect on the Croatians, because the need to establish the national state of Croatia proved to be stronger and a condition for the accession in Europe.
The entire problem of the Yugoslav crisis constituted in the fact that the former administrative borders of the partial Yugoslav republics were converted into national borders of sovereign states, where the former equivalent constitutional nations were turning into minorities. Milosević’s Serbia abolished the broad autonomy of Kosovo, which had been exploited by the Albanians in 1969-1989 for the promotion of antiserbian policy , Tuđman’s Croatia changed the Constitution and the Serbs in Kraina and Slavonia lost the equal status with the Croatians and became a minority. In Bosnia Alija Izetbegović, who had been sentenced in the past for spreading the Islamic fundamentalism, came to power as the leader of the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia, which raised concerns in the Serbs. Thus, the Serbian issue emerged not necessarily as an issue involving the founding of the Great Serbia with a territorial continuity, but as an issue of the status that the Serbs would have in the independent Croatia and Bosnia. The opinion of the Bandinter committee regarding the criteria for the recognition of the former Yugoslav republics as independent states essentially was infringed upon and the International Community accepted the former administrative borders of the partial Yugoslav republics as the borders of independent states, interpreting the right of self-determination of the Croats and the Slovenians as a right of secession and that of the Serbs as the right to preserve their national identity.
The active US military involvement and intervention in the summer of 1995 gave the known solution for Croatia and Bosnia – that is the expulsion of the Serbs from Kraina following an attack of the Croatian forces, trained by US veterans, the bombing of the Serbian positions in Bosnia, the promoting of the peace process which led to the signing of the disfunctional Dayton Agreement. The US intervention in the summer of 1995 was included in the more general plan by Washington for the expansion of NATO to the East and the establishment of protectorates, causing the reaction of Russia. Immediately after Dayton, in Tuzla (Bosnia) a US military base was established. In a special annex of the Dayton Agreement there was a provision for the free access of the NATO forces on the soil of Yugoslavia. Milosević’s refusal to apply the provisions of this special annex was the cause that fired the escalation of the crisis in Kosovo.
Despite the mistakes made by the Serbian leadership under Milosević, there is no doubt that the US side was particularly biased in favor of the Albanians and the key issue was to provoke the Serbs, in order to respond with retaliation and in this way to justify the NATO’s intervention being planned. The immediate objective of the Americans was to establish NATO in Kosovo. The Serbian leadership in Rambouillet accepted finally the international military presence in Kosovo, but it rejected the US ultimatum regarding the holding of a referendum in Kosovo following the lapse of three years, which would lead to the independence of the Serbian province. From the perspective of international law, the Albanians did not have a right to independence, like the Slovenians and the Croats, because Kosovo was de jure part of Serbia. The establishment of a large US base in Uroševac, following the withdrawal of the Serbs from Kosovo, and the obsession of the Americans with the solution of independence in Kosovo can explain the deeper motives of the NATO’s intervention against Yugoslavia, which essentially was the case for new geopolitical order. The developments in Kosovo had an effect on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where, following the inexplicable war of 2001 and the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, the Albanians in practice were recognized as an equal constitutional nation with the Slav Macedonians and the national-cultural gap between Albanians and Slav Macedonians tends to become impossible to bridge. [2]
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania into NATO and the subsequent agreements for the installation of US military bases in these two countries had very little to do with the war against terrorism. There were really energy reasons, the crossing of the oil pipelines throuhg Bulgaria and Romania – Constanza – Trieste and Burgas – Avlona (AMBO – Albanian – Macedonian Bulgarian Oil pipeline) – and geopolitical reasons, the developments in Caucasus and the blocking of Russia from the Black Sea. All these matters are of greater importance for the Americans. The control of the mid Balkan zone, from the Adriatic Sea to the Black Sea, became the strategic objective of the Americans. The recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia by the USA with its constitutional name “Republic of Macedonia” on the 4 November 2004 was mainly due to the effort of the Americans to avert a new conflict between Slav Macedonians and Albanians, where the interethnic relations after the events of 2001 remained quite tense.
The law regarding the redefinition of the municipalities, which provided the integration of Albanian villages in the municipality of Struga and of Kičevo, so that the Albanians would be the majority and have the opportunity to elect an Albanian mayor in both of these towns, as well as the integration of different regions in the municipality of Skopje, in order that the Albanians reach the 20% of population and the Albanian language becames official, caused strong reactions to the Slav Macedonians. The Slav Macedonian opposition organized a referendum in order to abolish the law, while the Albanians threatened that in the case of success of the referendum, they would organize a counter – referendum for secession. The recognition of FYROM by the USA with its constitutional name temporarily worked as a deterrent to the crisis, but it also proved how fragile was the balance in the FYROM, where a dividing line has been established between Albanians and Slav Macedonians. In the end of December 2004, immediately after the recognition of FYROM by the USA as ‘’Republic of Macedonia’’, the agreement for the construction of the AMBO was signed by Albania, FYROM and Bulgaria. It explains the interest of Washington for Albania and FYROM..
The expansion of NATO eastwards – in violation of the terms set by Gorbachov in 1990 regarding the union of Germany, that is the fact that the United Germany could become a member of NATO, but NATO in no case should expande eastwards – raised concern in Putin’s Russia. .Putin moved more within the framework of the Russian tradition, by rejecting the new liberal model of western capitalism and by introducing the directed democracy and a type of state run capitalism. Having succeeded in improving the Russian economy, Putin’s Russia reacted to the US policy which aimed at encircling Russia, by declaring an energy war against the United States as a potential means to exercise political influence in the Balkans and by trying to take advantage of the problems that were created from the dismantling of Yugoslavia. Russia, according to Putin, went through the stabilization stage and it is entering the stage where it will rise as a super-power.[3]
The energy war of the pipelines in the early 21st century reminds us of the railway war in the Balkans in the beginning of the 20th century. Russia is politically exploiting the Kosovo issue by adopting Serbian positions. The diplomatic maneuver of the Serbian government in 2005, that is to accept the transit of NATO forces on Serbian soil and to participate in the NATO program “Partnership for Peace”, did not vindicate the expectations of the Serbs that America could accept the Serbian proposal for the solution of the Kosovo issue, without harming the Serbian sovereignty, “something more than autonomy, something less than independence”. When Kostunica’s government was sure that the position of Russia on the Kosovo issue was stable, Belgrade looked to Moscow for a strategic partner. The Serbian and Russian stand is known – unilateral independence of Kosovo and cancellation of the Resolution 1244 of the Security Council constitute a strike on the authority of the UN and violation of international law; Kosovo is not the only case and it will become precedent for the manifestation of other secession movements. The fact that the Ahtisari plan about the monitored independence of Kosovo was not approved by the Security Council and the fact that the number of countries which recognized the self – declared by the Albanians independence of Kosovo on the 17 February 2008 is not the one expected (approximately 64 countries, but between them some important ones, like the United States, France and Germany) is a success of the Russian diplomacy.
The European Union as a body did not recognize the independence of Kosovo and several European countries, like Spain, Greece , Cyprus, Slovenia and Romania, until today hold a negative stand towards the independence of Kosovo. Spain fears any secession movements by the Basks, who declared that they will proceed with a referendum for their independence in 2010, Romania is afraid that the Mayars of Transylvania could demand autonomy and the Russians de jure secession of Transnistria from Moldavia; autonomy issues by the Mayars are also feared by Slovakia, Greece and Cyprus ponder on the effects from the recognition of the independence of Kosovo on the solution of the Cyprus issue and their relations with Russia. After hesitations Bulgaria recognized the independence of Kosovo, at the same time with Croatia and Hungary in March 2008, which caused the reactions by the academic community of the country.[4] But it is known that Bulgaria was subjected to intense pressure by the Americans to recognize Kosovo. Putin’s visit in Sofia (17-18 January 2008) and the celebrated signing of the Bulgarian-Russian agreement for the construction of the South Stream pipeline[5] disappointed Washington. Already, during the visit of the Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Ivailo Kalfin, in America (5.1.2008) Condolisa Rice had expressed her opposition to a possible signing of an agreement between Bulgaria and Russia, inviting Bulgaria to recognize the independence of Kosovo. In the FYROM, the newly elected prime minister Nikola Gruevski initially was hesitant to recognize the independence of Kosovo, despite the pressure he had from the Albanian parties of Menduh Thaçi and Ali Ahmeti. Despite the fact that Hasim Thaçi helped the campaign of Đukanović for the independence of Montenegro, the government of Montenegro was initially keeping a reserved stand.
Recognition of the independence of Kosovo by the government in Podgorica would mean a split in the public opinion of Montenegro and it would cause violent reactions by the dynamic Serbian minority (33%). It would also mean a rift with the historical tradition of the people of Montenegro, for which the “Kosovo Epic” is common legacy with the Serbs. 80% of the people of Montenegro is against the independence of Kosovo.[6] Bosnia-Herzegovina is not going to recognize Kosovo due to the intense objections of the Serb-Bosnians, who threaten with secession from the fragile and disfunctional state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The efforts made by the international factor to turn Bosnia-Herzegovina into one centralised state, by taking away powers from the autonomous Republic of Serbia and by establishing a common police did not come to fruition. Turkey recognized Kosovo immediately, despite the potential fears in Ankara about consequences on the Kurdish issue. Kosovo, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina are opening new prospects for Turkish investments.[7] For Albania, Kosovo’s independence is a matter of paramount importance. The visit of Kosovar prime minister Hasim Thaçi in Albania (19.6.2008) was characterized by Pristina and Tirana as a historical one. Hasim Thaçi and Sali Berisha signed agreements for a close collaboration in the energy, economy and education sector and, for obvious reasons, excluded the possibility of unification of Kosovo with Albania in the future. Thaçi made a distinction of the concepts of “national identity and state identity”. “Albanians have never been more solid and closer to one another. I am against the violation of the borders (sic!), but in favor of regional cooperation. We must distinguish between the national and the state identity. We have two different state identities, but Kosovo and Albania share a common national identity. We are Albanians”[8]..
It has become apparent that the case of Kosovo is not a special one, but it can be a precedent for movements of secession also in other regions with national problems. The recent crisis in South Ossetia and Abhazia (August 2008) is markedly characterized by political analysts as a metastasis of the Kosovo carcinoma, as the Russian answer to America. The new President of Russia, Dmitrij Medvedev, had the opportunity to inernationalize the Kosovo issue to the benefit of the Serbs. Russia, in the initiall phase of its conflict with the West, remaining loyal to the principles of international law and the inviolable nature of the borders, demanded a special status for South Ossetia and for Abhazia, respected dejure the territorial sovereignty of Georgia, but at the same time asked for the full enforcement of the resolution 1244 of the Security Council for Kosovo.[9] When Georgia detached itself from the Commonwealth of Independent States and America got involved in the crisis, by sending for the first time in the post-war history the US Sixth Fleet in the Black Sea, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abhazia, where it will install bases.[10]
Moscow is basically pursuing the overthrow of the President Sakashvili and a new moderate leadership in Tbilisi. The Kosovar leaders expressed their justified fears that perhaps the crisis in Caucasus may hinder the further recognition of Kosovo by other states. Comparing the American intervention in Kosovo and the Russian in South Ossetia, we can identify analogies but also certain differences. The Americans as well as the Russians intervened in order to avert a humanitarian disaster. But South Ossetia and Abhazia were parts of Russia before the Second World War, while Kosovo was never any part of Albania. So much in the war of 1991-92 as much as in the recent crisis, Russia did not initially raise the issue of independence for Abhazia and South Ossetia, it demanded a special regime. But after the active US involvement in Georgia Russia proceeded with the recognition of the independence of Abhazia and South Ossetia. Besides, the Russian peace forces were the first to receive an attack by the Georgian forces. Russia will continue to support Serbia on the Kosovo issue.
The Greek-Bulgarian agreement for the construction of the Burgas – Alexandroupoli oil pipeline, competitive to AMBO, and the recent agreements between Russia Bulgaria, Russia – Serbia and Russia – Greece for the construction of the natural gas pipeline called South-Stream, one competitive to the Nabucco pipeline (the planned crossing through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria) make the Balkans the center of transportation of the Russian energy towards Europe. Russia has the advantage compared to Azerbaijan in relation with the natural gas and oil reserves and with the Burgas – Alexandroupoli and South-Stream pipelines it makes it possible to ensure a shorter route of supply for Europe with Russian oil and natural gas. The advantages of the South-Stream (sufficient Russian reserves, shorter route from Russian ports to Bulgaria through the Black Sea) in relation with the Nabucco pipeline (insufficient reserves in the Caspian Sea, difficult crossing of the pipeline through the Turkish soil, uncertainty of cooperation with Iran) noted the Chairman of the World Energy Council, Slav Slavov.[11]
But the problem for the US side consists in the fact that the energy dependence of the Balkans on Russia may possibly mean, in the long term, also the exercise of Russian political influence. This is the reason why America, but also European countries, are promoting the fast construction of the Nabucco pipeline in the Balkans. Initially only Romania had signed an agreement for the crossing of the Nabucco pipeline, which is mainly of US interests, through the Romanian soil and President Basescu is an avid supporter of its construction.[12] But the crisis in South Ossetia, which threatens Georgia with an extended instability, raises the question to what extend is Georgia a safe country for the crossing of natural gas pipelines from Azerbaijan. Thus, there is already skepticism in Bucharest as to how feasible is the construction of the Nabucco pipeline.[13] Nevertheless, America will not give up Georgia, which will turn into a field of intense US – Russian competition, and it will continue to support the construction of the pipeline.
In Serbia the Russian political influence is given, irrespective of the result of the elections on the 11th May 2008 and the formation of the “unnatural” coalition government of the Democratic Party with the Socialists. The Socialist Party of Ivica Dačić had the historical opportunity to evolve into a modern Social-Democratic Party, to be included in the Social International and to return to power after a decade of absence.[14] The division of the Serbian political parties into nationalist (Radical Party, Serbian Democratic Party, Popular Party) and into European ones is basically pretentious and the key criterion for distinction is obviously the priority of the parties with regard to Kosovo or the accession in the EU. The vast majority of the Serbs wants the accession in the EU and 80% of the trade of Serbia is conducted with EU countries. The new government of Mirko Cvetković is no less patriotic than the previous government of Kostunica. When the Kosovars declared their independence on the 17 February 2008, Kostunica’s government, despite the disturbances in Kosovska Mitrovica and the protests in Belgrade[15], rejected the use of military assets or the enforcement of an embargo on Kosovo and chose to defend Kosovo through the diplomatic channels.
Cvetković’s government intends to enforce the same policy. The key point of conflict between the “nationalistic” and the “European parties” is obviously the price that Serbia must pay in order to be accessed in the EU; that is, if it will be forced to recognize the new reality in Kosovo in order to enter Europe. It is no accident that Kostunica’s party insisted on the legal interpretation of the association and stabilization agreement. The text of the agreement includes certain “legal traps” or “loopholes” related to Kosovo. Article 135 expressly mentions that the agreement is enforced exclusively on the soil of Serbia, without prejudice to the future of Kosovo. “This agreement is not enforced on Kosovo, which, for the time being is under international administration in accordance with the resolution 1244 of the 10th June, 1999 of the Security Council. It will not raise an issue of neither the future regime of Kosovo nor of the determination of its final regime”.[16]
This practically means that the European course of Kosovo and Serbia is currently following different roads; in the case of Kosovo by the Ahtisari plan and in the case of Serbia by the agreement of the 29th April 2008. However, the reference to the resolution 1244 in the text of the agreement and the fact that the EU as a body did not recognize the independence of Kosovo were enough reasons for the agreement to be ratified by the Serbian parliament, claim the “Euro-philes”. Article 17 makes reference to the cooperation of Serbia with other states that are candidates for accession in the EU, but did not sign association and stabilization agreements, and the the article 39 provides for the consulting role of the EU in the trade policy of Serbia with third states. From a narrow interpretation of the articles 17 and 39, the result is that Serbia must cooperate with Kosovo or not to block its accession in the international organizations, since it is only Kosovo that it has not signed in the Balkans yet association and stabilization agreement with the EU (Bosnia-Herzegovina did not sign, but it is included in this process), and that it is required to consult with the EU on its trade transactions with Russia. [17] But these obstacles can be bypassed. By a broader interpretation of the article 17, the constructive stand of Serbia towards Kosovo depends on its international facade.
A state without any international substance (member of the UN, the OSCE) will always be on conditional status, the Serbian side may claim. As Russia is a trade partner of the EU, Serbia, which has a European perspective, is entitled to have an autonomous trade policy towards Russia. Besides, article 39 does not name Russia. There is no doubt that the European countries, mainly Austria, are disenchanted with the prospect of the economic penetration of Russia in Serbia, which has a significant potential. In particular, the buying of the Serbian oil company NIS by Russian companies at a low cost (400 million EUROS) gives the European countries the opportunity to cultivate an anti-Russian climate in Serbia. Cvetković’s new government also looks upon Russia as a strategic partner, both due to the unreserved and constant Russian support on the Kosovo issue[18] as much as due to the prospect of Russian investments. In ranking the priorities of his foreign policy, Cvetković mentioned the continuation of the state policy for Kosovo and the ratification both of the association and stabilization agreement with the EU and the energy agreement of Serbia with Russia[19]. Both the agreement for the construction of the South-Stream pipeline as well as the association and stabilization agreement of the EU with Serbia were ratified finally by the Serbian parliament in September 2008. Serbia, being loyal to the tradition imposed on it by its geostrategic position, will move between EU and Russia and it will not, in the foreseeable future, be accessed into NATO. Russian President Dmitrij Medvedev ‘s visit to Serbia (October 21, 2009) opened new possibilities to fortify bilateral overall cooperation (1,5 billion dollars russian loan and a clutch of energy and development deals). Serbia and Russia agreed to establish a joint humanitarian centre in Niš for immediate response to emergencies in the Balkans, such fire, floods and earthquakes. However, analysts are supposing that this Russian logistical base for rescue operations could turn into a military base as a Russian counterweight to the American base in Kosovo.[20]
The criterion of cooperation with The Hague, an inviolable term by Holland in order to put into force the association and stabilization agreement of Serbia with the EU, is met. Until the end of April 2008, Serbia had extradited 43 people to the International Tribunal of The Hague. The acquittal of Haradinaj, charged for war crimes in Kosovo against the Serbs, and the cancellation of investigations regarding the trade of human organs of Serbs and Gypsies by the UÇK leaders, who today make up the political elite of Kosovo, prove that in the issue of war criminals a double standarts policy is applied. The arrest of Karadzić in July 2008 (and perhaps of Mladić in the future) eliminates even the last obstacles for the ratification and enforcement of the agreement between EU – Serbia.
The Serbian leadership harbors no illusions regarding the future of Kosovo. Of course it will never recognize Kosovo, a state that will have no place in the UN and in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it will try to make the state of Kosovo disfunctional and limit the number of states that will recognize it, it will obstruct the movement of Kosovars to Europe through Serbian soil, as it does not recognize Kosovo passports. In the UN General Assembly in September – October 2008 it raised the issue to refer to the International Tribunal of The Hague to give expert opinion, whether the declaration of independence of Kosovo violates International Law.[21] To ensure the necessary alliances, the Serbian diplomacy worked feverishly[22] and in the end the Serbs accomplished a diplomatic victory in the UN on the 8th October 2008. In the case of an affirmative opinion of the International Tribunal of The Hague, Belgrade will insist on the restart of the dialogue between Serbs and Albanians, despite the fact that the opinion will not be binding. But in the long term Serbia intends to achieve the partition of Kosovo as the only feasible solution and it will never abandon North Kosovo for obvious reasons.
Following the voting of the constitution of Kosovo the Serbs declared the establishment of their own Parliament in Kosovska Mitrovica.[23] Political analysts have already foreseen the nightmare of the “Cypriot scenario” in the case of Kosovo as well.[24] The Serbs are creating parallel structures in Kosovo, “a shadow state”, exactly as the Albanians did in the period of 1989-1999. Both President Tadić and Cvetković’s cabinet consider illegal the transfer of powers from the UNIMIK to the European mission EULEX, without the approval of the UN Security Council.[25] The transformation of Kosovo from a UN protectorate into a European Union protectorate, without the relevant decision of the UN Security Council, is essentially an application of the Ahtisari plan that bypasses the role of the Security Council. It was certain that, when the European mission EULEX was about to take over duties in Kosovo, the Serbs would obstruct its actions in North Kosovo. The Serbian government in the end consented to the deployment of the European mission, but under conditions. The agreement between Serbia with the EU and the UN provides for the participation of Serbia in the mission in the Serbian regions of Kosovo and the neutrality of EULEX regarding the status Kosovo; in other words, the resolution 1244 is typically effective. Under these conditions, the Albanians reacted to the deployment of the European mission. The Serbian population also in Kosovska Mitrovica, which is associated with Serbia, does not wish the European mission. Kosovo, south of Mitrovica, will be more closely linked with Albania. Already the US company Bechtel, where Bush is a shareholder, undertook the construction of the motorway Dyrrachium – Merdare.[26] European countries that recognized Kosovo are seeking to exploit the mineral wealth, especially lignite, for the production of electricity. Dispite the international economic aid, granted Kosovo, the ‘’new state’’ is disfunctional ( mafia, organized crime, lack of institutions). It proves that albanian society is still a clanish society.
Irrespective of the future of Kosovo, the Albanian issue in FYROM is getting worse. The two major Albanian parties, the Democratic Party of Albanians, led by Menduh Thaçi, and the Democratic Union for Integration have common positions and are competing in the national high bidding for political reasons. They demanded the immediate recognition of Kosovo, the equal participation of the Albanian language as a second “service language”, representation proportional to the Albanian population in public services, the pensioning of the families of the victims – fighters of UÇK etc. The Albanians of FYROM are directly associated with Kosovo. A long term goal of the Albanians in FYROM is their secession and their union with Kosovo. Due to the pressure of the Americans and the Albanians, Gruevski’s government recognized the independence of Kosovo early in October 2008. But Skopje did not establish yet diplomatic relations with Pristina. In Skopje one realizes the regional implications of Kosovo’s independence.
The dynamics of the Albanian nationalism was the reason that also set off the Slav Macedonian nationalism. Greece managed to internationalize the issue of the name in view of the prospect for the accession of FYROM into NATO and the granting of a date for the commencement of negotiations for the accession of FYROM in the EU. Gruevski’s government downgraded the issue and estimated that Greece would find itself isolated and would not dare put a veto in Bucharest regarding the accession of FYROM into NATO. The Greek veto and the final decision of the summit in Bucharest (April 2008) for the accession of Albania and Croatia into NATO and the exclusion of FYROM until a mutually accepted solution is found with Greece on the issue of the name caused great disappointment in FYROM. Gruevski’s government took over a nationalist rhetoric and declared the holding of early elections with a view to achieving absolute majority for a more effective defense of the national interests. The high percentage of Gruevski in the African style elections of June (62 seats) is an event without precedent in the political scene of FYROM. For the next four years FYROM will be a single-party state, without any essential opposition, and it will obviously have government stability, since Gruevski’s party, VMRO-DPMNE, has the majority in Parliament and the survival of his cabinet does not depend on the support of the co-governing Albanian party of Ali Ahmeti. Thus, Gruevski has the privilege to raise the nationalist spirit in its warfare against Greece in order to respond to the expectations of its voters and to reinforce its leverage. Already, prior to the summit in Bucharest, Gruevski’s government had worked out a 12-point plan as the basis of the future strategy against Greece, in the case that Athens would put a veto.
Key points of the plan is to raise an issue about a ‘’Macedonian minority’’ in Greece, the compensation to the Slav Macedonian refugees – children of the civil war that were “forced out” of Greece, the boycott of all written communication bearing the name FYROM, the reinstatement of the flag with the sun of Vergina, the cancellation of the constitutional amendment of 1992 regarding the non involvement of “Macedonia” in the internal affairs of the neighboring countries, that is raising a minority issue, massive use of ancient Macedonian names, applying to the UN for recognition with their constitutional name, close cooperation with the United States and Turkey and the non recognized “Republic of Northern Cyprus”.[27] Gruevski’s letter writing tactics to the Greek government, the EU, NATO and to Nimiz for the recognition of the “Macedonian minority” in Greece, for the compensation of the “Slav Macedonians Aegean refugees, victims of the Greek monarchy – fascism during the Greek civil war”, for the facilitation of their return to Greece, for the recognition of the “Church of Macedonia” by the Orthodox Church of Greece and the renaming of the airport in Thessalonica from Macedonia airport to Micra airport are an effort to stir the “Aegean issue” as an operation for diversion against Greece. Gruevski, who originates from Greek Macedonia (his grandfather Nikolaos Gruios was from the village Skopos in Florina and was killed in the Greek-Italian war)[28] is flirting with the Aegean refugees. He made efforts, due to the circumstances (2008 marked the completion of 60 years from the so called “child gathering, the mass exodus of Slav Macedonians in 1948″), to internationalize the “Aegean issue”. But he met with no response. The Greek prime minister denied the existence of a “Macedonian” minority in Greece and advised the interested persons to refer to the courts, in order for these to decide regarding the properties of the Slav Macedonian refugees that were seized by the Greek state.
The EU, UN NATO and Nimiz deemed as untimely this stirring of regional issues and pointed out that the main issue of the conflict remains in the name. In FYROM President Cervenkovski emphasized the risk of populism for the Euro-Atlantic prospects of the country.[29] Other political and social circles in Skopje are criticizing Gruevski for his ineffective mania with letter writing.[30] Without any foundation is also the decision made by Gruevski’s government to refer Greece to the International Court of Justice due to violation of the Interim Agreement in the sense that Greece obstructed the accession of FYROM into NATO. The agreement provides that Greece will not hinder the accession of FYROM in the international organizations as FYROM, but the spirit of the agreement is the reinstatement of good neighboring relations, which did not happen due to the rigid position of FYROM on the name issue. A question is asked, as to how much is the International Court of Justice competent to give expert opinion on the specific matter. Thus, for the time being, no solution prospects can be foreseen regarding the conflict of Greece-FYROM about the name. FYROM ‘s new President, Georgi Ivanov, is Gruevski’ s mouthpiece.
The Greek-FYROM conflict is basically a matter of identity. Greece denies the historical nature of the “Slav Macedonian nation”, but it may accept that a new identity is being created in FYROM after 1944. On the part of FYROM fears are expressed about the undermining of the national identity of the Slav Macedonians, if the compromise solution that may be found between Athens and Skopje applies erga ommes, as pointed out by the Greek side, and touches upon issues of national identity and language. The most probable development perhaps of things will be to find a solution for international use (Northern Macedonia, Upper Macedonia, New Republic of Macedonia), without hurting the Slav Macedonian identity of the state domestically.
No matter which solution would be found in the Greek-FYROM conflict regarding the name of this state in the international organizations – the conflict for the name is essentially a conflict to delineate the identities – in the present phase the Slav Macedonians in FYROM will neither write their national history differently[31] nor will they stop referring to the existence of “Macedonian minorities” in the neighboring countries.[32] There is a number of “regional issues” that will arise, should there be set the issue of final reinstatement of good neighboring relations between Greece, Bulgaria and FYROM. For example, what will be the meaning of the term “Macedonian language” in the EU? For Greece, “Macedonian language” is the language of the Ancient Macedonians, for Bulgaria “the Macedonian language” is ‘’a serbianized’’ western Bulgarian idiom, for FYROM this is a self existing language, “the most ancient written Slavic language”.
Until when will the Orthodox Church of FYROM be characterized as schismatic, it must be renamed from “Orthodox Macedonian Church” to “Archdiocese of Ochrid” and to have a special relationship with the Patriarchate of Serbia in order to gain recognition ? Bulgaria, like Greece, does not recognize the existence of a “Macedonian nation” and of “Macedonian minorities”, it tries to deflate the national ideology of “Slav Macedonism” also within the framework of the EU,[33] it demands the constitutional recognition of the rights of the Bulgarians on FYROM and exercises criticism on the historians of Skopje regarding the falsification of the Bulgarian history.[34] It may be said with certainty that Greece, Bulgaria and FYROM are not going to come to agreement about the historical aspects of the Macedonian issue. Neither Greece nor Bulgaria will ever recognize “Macedonian minorities” within their sovereignty.[35]
Having fresh his triumphant election victory, Gruevski is following push and pull tactics on the issue of the name ( he has not officially proposed a name until today and insists that the problem is bilateral), pretending that Karamanlis’s government did not wish a solution, either due to the Euro-elections of 2009 or due to his borderline majority in parliament and the possibility for early elections. In a show to prove national pride and a grandeur of “glorious isolation”, similar to the one of Enver Hoxha, he states that his country shall continue to develop and progress even in the case that it will not be accessed into NATO and the EU. [36]
The immature political leadership of Skopje, which is leading the country into a impass situation, is overestimating the importance of FYROM in the strategic goals of America and it is nurturing hopes that due to the need for the expansion of NATO, following the events in Georgia, America will exercise pressure on its allies for the accession of FYROM into NATO with the name issue still pending. But FYROM does not have the geo-strategic position of Georgia. The major Greek political parties hold a consenting line on the Skopje issue and, irrespective of the political developments in Greece, any Greek government will not deviate from the fixed position. This national issue is a chronic one and cannot constitute grounds for domestic consumption, for the diversion of the public opinion from the political scandals and developments in the country. The new Papandreu ‘ s government is pursuing the same policy. With the accession of Albania and Croatia into NATO, the goals of the US policy in the Balkans were accomplished to a great extend. Circles of the Slav Macedonian opposition pointed out that the administration of Bush provided Gruevski with a good opportunity for the resolution of the conflict with Greece, because under Obama in America the US policy will be harder towards Skopje, given that the election campaign of Obama was funded by the Greek lobby in America. [37]
Regardless of the outcome of the American elections, the US interest will be focused in Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. The US State policy will be involved again in matters like the Russian factor and the return of Russia into the Balkans holding the energy factor in the pocket. There was a great amount of pressure exerted by the US to avoid the ratification of the agreements for the construction of the South Stream pipeline by the parliaments of Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia.
In expressing its disenchantment towards the government of Bulgaria for the signing of the agreement with Russia for the natural gas pipeline South Stream, the US government exercised intense pressure on Sofia for the recognition of Kosovo, to which the Stanišev government succumbed. Also, the EU as well, which is investing on the Nabucco pipeline, expressed its discontent to Sofia and gave the impression that it will not fund the construction of the South Stream pipeline.[38] During her visit in Sofia, in the beginning of July 2008, Condolisa Rice urged the Bulgarian side to sign an agreement for the construction of the Nabucco pipeline, prior to ratifying the agreement for the South Stream pipeline.[39] It is no accident that the EU reduced the funds for Bulgaria, due to incidents of corruption, while it did not do the same in the case of Romania, which was equally charged with corruption. The main reason for this double standarts policy is obviously the fact that Bulgaria signed an agreement for the South Stream pipeline,[40] while Romania did so for the Nabucco. President Georgi Pârvanov is the recipient of hard criticism even by representatives of the Socialist Party for his pro-Russian position on the energy issue. The Bulgarian Parliament, like the Greek Parliament, ratified the agreement for the South Stream pipeline. Finally, Bulgaria did agree to participate in the construction of the Nabucco pipeline as well. But the new bulgarian government under Bojko Borisov, showing its European profil and being badly in need of European funds, does not consider as a matter of urgency the construction of the South-Stream pipeline[41] . Regarding the Burgas-Alexandroupolis oilpipeline Borisov announced the reconsideration of the relative agreement with Russia. [42] The real reasons are not the protection of the environment in Bourgas and the damage to tourism, as Bulgarian officials argue, but the unwillness of America to see Russia into the Aegean See.
The economic penetration of Russia is intense in Montenegro and Russian money has begun to flow into Banja – Luka in Bosnia. The vast majority of the people in Montenegro are in favor of their country’s accession into the EU, but not into NATO. Also, they are against the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, something which is a rupture with the entire historical tradition of the Montenegrinians. For them ” Kosovo Epic of 1389″ is a hallmark. But Hasim Thaçi, who funded the campaign of Đukanović for the independence of Montenegro, in the end imposed the recognition of Kosovo by Podgorica in the beginning of October 2008, causing very strong reactions in the Serbian minority.
It is obvious that the Balkan region continues its tradition as a field of competition of the Great Powers. The structural approach of history according to Braudel, that is the fact that the geographical and geopolitical situations of a place define its destiny, is verified fully in the case of the Balkans. The racist Nazi Germany officially introduced the term “Southeast Europe” instead of the derogatory term “Balkans”. The reasons were mainly economic, the economic penetration of the Third Reich in the Balkans, a vital region that was part of Europe. There is a large number of political analysts today, who, despite the European course of the Balkans, consider the Balkan region as the region of Caucasus.
The terrorist attack on September 11 was the pretense for USA for the continuation of NATO’s expansion eastwards, the installation of US military bases in Central Asia, the encircling of Russia and the demonstration of power against China.[43] It reacting to this, Russia, established an Anti-NATO in Central Asia, the organization of Shanghai (Russia, China, Kirgisia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazahstan). America established the Philo-Western coalition GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbaijan), in Caucasus. The Balkans were included in this tag of war of competition between the USA and Russia.
In the globalization of the modern era, where NATO must define its new role and the EU did not manage neither to become a counterbalance to America and Russia nor to formulate a system for collective security with the participation of Russia, the national states are required to define their policy based on the national interests. Romania for example is in line with Russia on the Kosovo issue, but it supports the Nabucco pipeline. Hungary recognized the independence of Kosovo, but it supports the South-Stream pipeline. Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria must continue their cooperation with Russia, contributing to the creation of a multipolar world as a factor to reinstate the balance of the international system.
[1] See Politika (Serbian newspaper), 30.4.2008. For an approach to the matter of the signing of the association and stabilization agreements between the EU and the Balkan states, but also of the accession of the Balkans into the energy war of pipelines see V. Cačevski, Balkanite. Evropejskijat izbor, Sofia 2007, by the same, Balkanite. Novata Jugoiztočna Evropa, Sofia 2007.
[2] For new information regarding the background of the negotiations which lead to the Ohrid Framework Agreement, see V.Latifi, Zhvillimi i negociatave 1. Negocimi për arritjen e marrëveshjes së Ohrit, Skopje 2007, by the same, Zhvillini i negociatave 2. Negocimi si teknikë parësore për zgjidhjen e konflikteve, Skopje 2007.
[3] See Putin’s speeches and assessments by analysts regarding the future role of Russia in the collective volume, Kakvo misli Rusija ( edited by M. Minčev, Ilijana Veleva), Sofia 2008.
[4] See the statements made by the Academician Georgi Markov about the effect of the independence of Kosovo on the FYROM, Standart (Bulgarian newspaper), issue of 20.3.2008. Regarding the Bulgarian position in general, see the Monitor (Bulgarian newspaper), 20.3.2008+25.3.2008.
[5] The signing of the agreement coincided with the anniversary of 130 years from the establishment of the Bulgarian state (3.3.1878) with the essential help of Russia. The year 2008 has been declared as the year of Bulgaria in Russia and of Russia in Bulgaria. The emerging Rossofilia in Bulgaria raises concerns in America. Regarding Putin’s visit in Sofia, where he spoke about a “healthy pragmatism in the relations between Bulgaria – Russia”, see the special editorial of the Bulgarian magazine Bolgarskij diplomatičskij obzor. ‘’ 130-letie Osvoboždenija Bolgarii i okončanija Russko-tureskoj vojny . Georgij Părvanov i Vladimir Putin orkryli v Sofija God Rossii v Bolgarii’’, Bolgarskij diplomatiskij Obzor 1(2008) 6-25.
[6] Politika (Serbian newspaper), 2.7.2008.
[7] See, Standart , 26.3.2008.
[8]See, Monitor (Bulgarian newspaper), 20.6.2008. About the stand of the Balkan states towards the independence of Kosovo, see A. Ernst, ‘’Kosovos Unabhängigkeit aus der Perspektive seiner Nachbarn’’, in the collective work, Berhard Chiari -Agil Keßelring (editor), Wegweiser zur Geschichte. Kosovo. Im Auftrag des Militärgeschitlichen Forschungsamtes, Paderborn- München- Wien-Z ürich 2008, pp. 153-163.
[9] See the statements in Brussels by Dmitrij Rogozin, Russian representative in NATO “Respecting the territorial integrity of Georgia will not be feasible, without the respect of the territorial integrity of Serbia in Kosovo – Metochi. It is not possible to recognize the independence of Kosovo and at the same time to insist on repeating that the territorial integrity of Georgia must be respected on the issue of South Ossetia. If we have the territorial integrity of Serbia in Kosovo, then we have also the territorial integrity of Georgia… Due to what NATO committed in Yugoslavia – murders of citizens, destruction of the bridges on Denube, the Serbian television – it is not entitled to criticize Russia for its current or for its future action”., Politika (Serbian newspaper), 18.8.2008. With the war in Ossetia Russia wanted obviously to prove that the allies of America in sensitive regions to the Russian interests cannot count on the effective help from the USA, when Russia feels that it is threatened. America on the other hand, is cultivating the psychosis of the Russian danger in the countries of the former Eastern Europe. The signing of the agreement between US – Poland was no accident regarding the installation of an anti-ballistic shield in Poland during the height of crisis in Caucasus. The new Polish government under Tesk had initially expressed reservations, considering the retaliation from Russia. The installation of anti-ballistic shield in the Czech Republic is not approved by the Czech citizens; 70% of the population is against it. The question remains open as to how much of the cost will America accept to bear for the installation of the anti-ballistic shield in the Czech Republic and in Poland, including also any possible Russian retaliation. Political analysts estimate that the Americans caused the crisis in Georgia in order to lift the reservations of the Polish, due to the supposed Russian risk, in relation with the installation of the anti-ballistic shield. 60^% of the Polish citizens are against the installation of the anti-ballistic shield. Meanwhile, the new american administration under Obama gave up these plans and announced a (unclear) mobile sea-based missile defence system, giving guarantees of security to the Czech Republic and to Poland. The new cold-war, as well as the former ideologically fortified cold war 1945-1989, is without geographical borders.
[10] According to the information at hand, the Russian fleet of the Black Sea will be transferred in Sokhumi, after his remonal from Sevastopolis in 2017, see Monitor (Bulg. newspaper) 15.11.2008.
[11]See România Liberă (Romanian newspaper), 27.6.2008.
[12] See Romania Liberă, 16.3.2008.
[13] See România Liberă, 13.8.2008.
[14] Regarding the problems that the new government is called upon to confront, both in the foreign policy as well as in the social policy in order to vindicate the expectations of the voters for the Socialists and pensioners, see the article, “Nova Vlada Srbije. Budućnost jedino vreme’’, Nin, 26.6.2007.
[15] See Nin, 20.3.2008.
[16] Politika, 30.4.2008.
[17] For the interpretation of the articles 17 and 39, see ‘’ Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju’’ Nin, 8.5.2008.
[18] See the statements by Alexander Aleksejev, former Russian ambassador in Belgrade and now in charge of the IV European Department (Balkans, Middle East) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “U odbrani Kosova stajaćemo čvrsto, kao pod Staljingradom’’, Politika, 27.5.2008.
[19] Politika, 13.7.2008. See also the interview of Dinkić, energy minister in Cvetković ‘s cabinet, ‘’Volim i ja Ruse’’, Nin, 17.7.2008
[20] Nedeljni Telegraf, (Serbian newspaper) 28.10.2009.
[21] Regarding the tough diplomatic battle of Serbia, see the statements of the Foreign minister Vouk Yeremic, Politika, 18.8.2008. Regarding the legal problems that are raised due to the declaration fo independence of Kosovo, without a UNO resolution, see M. Marten, ‘’Perspektiven für das unabhängige Kosovo’’, in the collective work, Wegweiser zur Geschichte. Kosovo, ibid, pp. 125-137. Apart from the problematic to impossible entry of Kosovo in the UNO and in the international organizations there also difficulties arising of practical nature, for example in telecommunications. For a state to be allocated an international code by the International Telecommunication Union which is seated in Geneva, it must be a member of the UNO. For international calls in Kosovo currently, the land line international code of Serbia is applied (00381); in mobile telephony there is use of the Monaco code (00377) that was “leased” by Kosovo.
[22] See the article, “Lobirane pred generalnu skupstinu UN. Treća diplomatska ofanziva’’, Nin, 14.8.2008.
[23] Politika, 2.7.2008.
[24] See H. Brey, ”Kosovo and the Cyprus Scenario-a Nightmare and a Missed Opportunity’’, Südosteuropa-Mitteilungeng (4) 2007, S.30-45.
[25] Politika, 15.7.2008.
[26] See Nedeljni Telegraf ), 19.3.2008.
[27] See the main article “Evropski leten molk za makedonsko prašanje’’, Nova Makedonija, 14.8.2008.
[28] See the interesting article of the newspaper, Dnevnik “Dnevnik vo selata od koi poteknuvaat Gruevski i Karamanlis’’, where Karamanlis and Gruevski are compared (they both come from the Greek Macedonia) and a question is asked as to how this factor is affecting their obsession in the name Dnevnik (Skopje newspaper), 28.7.2008.
[29] Utrinski Vesnik (Skopje newspaper), 15.7.2008.
[30] See Nova Makedonija, 23.8.2008.
[31] About the modern trends of the Slav Macedonian historiography, see Sp. Sfetas, “Trends of the modern Slav Macedonian historiography”, in the collective work, Macedonian identities through time. Inter-disciplinary approaches (editing I. Stefanidis, V. Vlassidis, E. Kofos), Foundation of the Museum of the Macedonian Struggle, Patakis Press, Athens 2008, pp. 296-316.
[32] See the recent monograph by F. Taševska-Remenski about the “Macedonian minorities” in Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania, who recycles the well known views and was awarded the state prize, F. Taševska -Remenski, Makedonskoto nacionalno malcinstvo vo sosedite zemji: Sovremeni sostojbi, Skopje 2007.
[33] See the simplified study by B. Dimitrov for the 10 lies of Macedonism, which was translated in English and circulated in the European Parliament, B. Dimitrov, 10te Lâži na Makedonisma, Sofia 2006. Recently, Bulgarian historians published the diary of Krste Misirkov, in which the former supporter of the Slav Macedonism and anti Bulgarism ideology laments for the tragic fate of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War. See Κ.P.Misirkov, Dnevnik 5.VII.-30.VIII.1913 (edited by, Z. Todorovski – C. Biljarski), Sofia – Skopje 2008. The purpose of the publication of the diary was to prove that Misirkov was viewing Slav Macedonism in 1903 simply as political convention due to the circumstances. Misirkov’s diary was characterized as a politological analysis of the plots against Bulgaria during the Second Balkan War, See Ι. Nikolov, “Dnevnik na Misirkov ot 1913g.-politologičen analiz na intrigite sreštu Bâlgarija”, Bâlgarija-Makedonija 3 (2008), pp. 17-19.
[34] See the recent tri-lingual (Bulgarian, Slav Macedonian and English language) collective work of Bulgarian scientists regarding the proper policy by Sofia towards the FYROM, Βulgarian policies on the Republic of Macedonia(editing by L. Ivanov), Sofia 2008.
[35] See the recent monograph by D. Tjoulekov about the political legend of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, D. Tjoulekov, Političeskijat mit za ‘’makedonskoto malcinstvo’’ v Bâlgarija , Blagoefgrand 2007. To unfounded request of the Slav Macedonian leadership about the return of the properties of the Slav Macedonian refugees can be answered by the fact that the Slav Macedonians had a “fluid” conscience and cooperated either with the German and Bulgarian authorities or with the international communism in the period 1944-49 for the territorial mutilation of Greece. With regard to the so called child gathering, it may be said that this was conducted by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) not so much for humanitarian reasons as it was for political reasons. Following the decision of the Third Plenary of the KKE (September 1947) about increasing the forces of the rebels of the Democratic Army to 60.000 with a view to the liberation of Northern Greece, KKE proceeded with a violent draft. In order to recruit the parents and be relieved from the care of the children, these were sent to the Eastern countries for care, where in the future they would be also an armed human resource. The men were enlisted in the Democratic Army .Women either served as stretcher-bearers in the battles or they were engaged in the construction of trenches and shelters. After the formulation of the Provisional Democratic Government of the rebels and the declaration of the KKE as illegal (December 1947), the Democratic Army was expecting major scale operations by the government army. In the second half of 1948 and the beginning of 1949, about 2000 children, aged 14-16, were sent by the Eastern countries to the front. Only Poland refused the return of the children for the front. See the issue of relevant documents from the Polish archives with translation into the Slav Macedonian language, Makedonskite Begalci vo Polska. Dokumenti, 1948-1975 (1), (edited by Zoran Todorovski- Slawomir Radon), Skopje 2008, p. 19.
[36] See Nova Makedonija, 22.8.2008.
[37] See the article and comments of Slav Macedonian politicians about the consequences of a victory for Obama. “Obama nema da bide za Grcija toa što beše Buš za Makedonija ?”, Globus , broj61, 17.6.2008, ss. 18-23.
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[38] See 168 Časa (Bulgarian newspaper), 14-20 .3.2008.
[39] See 168 Časa, 18-24.7.2008.
[40] See 168 Časa, 1-7. 8.2008.
[41] See 168 Časa, 24-30.7. 2009.
[42] Monitor, 2.9.2009.
[43] See the assessments of the former Russian prime minister E. Primakov, E. Primakov, Svetot po 11 septemvri i invazijata vrz Irak (translation from Russian to Slav Macedonian ), Skopje 2006.
Prof. Spyridon Sfetas is Associate Professor for Balkan History, Aristotle University (Thessaloniki, Greece)- Research Fellow at the Institute for Balkan Studies (Thessaloniki, Greece)
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